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THE FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION AS A
PROJECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
David M. Golove* & Daniel J. Hulsebosch**
The simple circumstance, that your Constitution forces international law on
you, as an integral part of your studies . . . is, in my opinion, an advantage
far beyond that of our superior accuracy (if we have it) in our own common
law, acquired by the comparatively narrow range of our studies.
—Sir John Taylor Coleridge to Joseph Story1

INTRODUCTION
When early Americans talked governance, they used the language of the
law of nations. Representative government was the keystone; republican
ideology circulated widely; liberal ideas of trade and rights percolated; and
reformed Protestantism and newly scientific notions of race informed early
American political thought as well. Early Americans spoke all these
languages in their eclectic pursuit of novus ordo seclorum. Yet when it came
time to govern—to imagine the federal state, draft the Constitution, and then
to formulate and administer policy—no language was more commonly
deployed than that of the law of nations.
Claiming membership in a world of self-denominated “civilized nations,”
the revolutionaries had little choice. Necessity, however, was also
opportunity. The law of nations was their ticket to membership. This was
not just because it was the lingua franca of diplomacy. In addition to
mediating relations between nations, the eighteenth-century law of nations
also provided resources for envisioning how to govern a nation internally.
This language was not just discourse. Its referents included principles,
doctrines, dispute resolution institutions, and compendia of “best practices”
* Hiller Family Foundation Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
** Russell D. Niles Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This Essay was
prepared for the Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution, hosted by the Fordham Law
Review on October 2, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law. The authors are grateful
for comments received from Richard Primus and other Symposium participants, as well as for
the support of the D’Agostino-Greenberg Faculty Research Fund at New York University
School of Law.

1. Letter from J. T. Coleridge to Joseph Story (Feb. 10, 1842), in 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF
JOSEPH STORY 428, 428 (William W. Story ed., Boston Charles C. Little & James Brown
1851). Coleridge was a judge on the Court of King’s Bench in Britain from 1835 to 1858. J.
A. Hamilton, Coleridge, Sir John Taylor, in 11 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 302
(Leslie Stephen ed., London Smith, Elder & Co. 1887).
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circulating through Enlightenment Europe. It also imported a reflective,
sociable style of reasoning, in which nations were supposed to make
decisions by imagining how other nations would judge them. In sum, the law
of nations was a language for working through the process of building a state
that was supposed, in concert with others, to contribute to “civilization.”2
Three dimensions of the early modern law of nations made it especially
useful to American state builders. First was its strictly international
dimension, which overlaps with what is now called public international law.
Its main elements were treaties and the customary law of nations. A second
dimension contained a host of historical examples of domestic governmental
institutions and policies, as well as an ongoing transnational conversation
about what it meant to be a civilized nation. The founding generation drew
on this dimension, which today might be called comparative constitutional
law, to build and navigate the complex federal structure of its government.
Finally, a third, transnational dimension contained natural law principles and
common usages that were supposed to help coordinate cross-border relations
among states and their citizens. Commercial and maritime law were
exemplary, providing or aspiring to uniform rules for transactions between
private actors. Yet unlike today, few in the eighteenth century referred to
these bodies of law as “private law.” They too were branches of the general
law of “civilized” states.
Recovering this three-stranded language of governance sheds light on the
origins and early history of the U.S. Constitution. Most generally, it reveals
the pervasiveness of the law of nations within early American governance—
its centrality in not only assisting the revolutionary generation to gain
independence but also in constructing and implementing a working
government. The intense resort to the law of nations also illuminates the
connection between the domestic and the foreign, constitution making and
diplomacy, commerce and international civilization. In addition, early
Americans’ use of the law of nations reveals the complex interplay between
rule boundedness, on the one hand, and creativity and rule avoidance, on the
other. The law of nations was, like many legal languages, full of selfdeceiving aspiration. It was also made to be used and could be remade along
the way. Like any functional language, it helped people realize their projects,
but because those projects were so diverse and at times contradictory, it could
never rationalize them all. The law of nations was, therefore, critical to the
founding generation’s attempt to govern the ungovernable. Because legal
understandings of the founding generation continue to influence
constitutional construction more than two centuries later—and not only
among originalists—recovering early Americans’ use of the law of nations
facilitates a deeper understanding of their revolutionary project.

2. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 936–37 (2010).
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I. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND CONSTITUTION MAKING
Few people immersed themselves more deeply in the law of nations than
revolutionary Americans. They developed the faith of new, sometimes
desperate, converts. From the Declaration of Independence and the writing
of state constitutions, to the forging of a confederation to wage war and make
treaties, the institutions, forms, and doctrines of the law of nations structured
the quest to escape the British Empire and create new republican
governments. Peace then opened fissures among the states, which revealed
international problems whose solutions, and even apprehension, depended on
the law of nations. Consequently, debate over the relationship between
republicanism and the legal norms of what the revolutionaries called the
“civilized world” featured large when they wrote and ratified the
Constitution.3
Yet the law of nations only became a basic idiom of American governance
when the founding generation turned from constitution making to federal
state building and struggled to convert sparse text into effective government.
They continually used it to explain, justify, or oppose some policy or
institution that was claimed to be necessary or beneficial. Contestation and
debate about the meaning and place of the law of nations within American
governance then circulated widely throughout American political culture.4
The law of nations was a transatlantic language. Americans’ use of it was
not exceptional. Yet because of the complexity of American government—
its federal structure, separated powers, and cascading claims rights—as well
as the distinctive tendency to constitutionalize all manner of controversy in
popular debates, the American idiom of this transatlantic language was
unusual. If Federalists labored to build a constitution that would fit the nation
into a world supposedly operating under law, they did so in ways that
complicated the very object sought.
The constitutional status of the law of nations was from the beginning
vexed with ambiguity. Because of its various dimensions, different parts of
the law had different degrees of obligation.
Constitution makers
incorporated some aspects of the law of nations within their design and then
acted as though others that defined nationhood in contemporary terms would
be obligatory as well. They also drew on the comparative law of nations to
build and manage their state and assumed that courts would resort to the
transnational law of nations for rules of decision in cases that raised issues
within its ambit. The result was a complex incorporation of the law of
nations—binding for some purposes, adopted implicitly in others, and
privileged or preferred in transnational disputes between private individuals.
The pluralism of the law of nations was part of its attraction. Its
capaciousness offered American leaders the illusion, occasionally real, of
administrative mastery. Even where the law of nations did not deliver clear
answers, it often offered ways to think through problems. Ordinary
3. Id. at 947–49.
4. See id. at 1015–61.
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Americans and their lawyers similarly grabbed elements of the law of nations
to make their way in an unruly and expansive empire. Here, the view from
capitols, courts, countinghouses, and quarter sections overlapped: the law of
nations offered ways of imagining a more advantageous future, ordering the
disordered, and governing spaces and peoples that resisted government.
The mix within the law of nations of mandate and model justifies applying
the term “governance” to capture early Americans’ use of that law.
Governance connotes the project of managing and ordering in the absence of
undisputed sovereign authority or enforcement capacity. The concept
originated in scholarship on public administration that analyzed
undergoverned or ungovernable areas of the world, from cities to
international relations.5 Even in the absence of a coherent international
government, for example, institutions of global governance have had
substantial effects on national government, international commerce, and
individual lives.6 Similarly, in the early United States, the law of nations
offered resources for imagining a more ordered future and trying to realize
it.
As imaginative as early Americans were in their use of the law of nations,
there were limits to how innovative they could be. In contrast to the purely
domestic aspects of their constitutional system or, in historically accurate
terms, American municipal law, the law of nations was never theirs to shape
at pleasure. It was a collective, international project. This aspect of the early
modern law of nations has been difficult for modern scholars to understand
and convey historically. The reasons go beyond the typical complexity of
marking out the boundaries and function of a body of law that extended
across time and space and whose jurisdiction and substance were continually
debated. These problems characterize many bodies of law, including ones
familiar to early American lawyers and historians. The “common law” is a
prime example. Instead, the difficulty with the law of nations is the
aspirational premise: the notion of a common project across borders. One
reason for this difficulty might be the twentieth-century development of
human rights law, along with independent international courts, which critics,
including many in the United States, perceive as encroaching on national
sovereignty. Many American scholars who are skeptical of modern human
rights law also embrace originalism as a method of constitutional
interpretation.7 The combination sometimes generates extreme denials of
legal cosmopolitanism in early America, leaving some to conclude that the

5. Cf. Anthony Pagden, The Genesis of “Governance” and Enlightenment Conceptions
of the Cosmopolitan World Order, 50 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 7 (1998). See generally Marie-Claude
Smouts, The Proper Use of Governance in International Relations, 50 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 81
(1998).
6. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, The Administrative Law Frontier in Global
Governance, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 143 (2005); Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword:
Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to Global
Administrative Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 1.
7. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).

2021]

A PROJECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

1845

law of nations in early America was at most a species of state law.8 Evidence
of more robust engagement with the law of nations then becomes a problem
to minimize, explain away, or ignore.9
Deemphasizing the early American engagement with the law of nations,
however, obscures much of what makes the Federalist Constitution
intriguing, strange, and almost foreign to modern eyes. Yet recovering that
commitment also begins to reveal the complex ambitions of revolutionary
constitution making that do resonate with modern ambitions and anxieties
surrounding global interdependence. Their problems were not ours; their
debates and solutions very different. Still, their efforts to draw new
jurisdictions to extend across and integrate different polities; their grappling
with the law of slavery; their expropriation of indigenous land through
treaties; their ambivalence toward a self-righteous Atlantic world shot
through with inequality, state-supported violence, and (a favorite catchall)
“corruption”—their groping, in other words, to build a nation that would
participate in but also claim to improve an extranational project of
civilization—sometimes looks familiar, like scattered cognates in an epic
composed in a forgotten language.10 What is lost is the structure of this early
American language of governance.
II. THE FUNCTIONAL LANGUAGE OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
When early Americans turned to the law of nations, what did they find in
it? And what was in it for them? Instead of offering an intellectual genealogy
of the law of nations or a list of vaunted Enlightenment legal principles that
influenced American constitution making, we begin by suggesting how early
Americans used it. What sorts of law jobs did they believe the law of nations
was fit to perform? The short answer is many—a multitude that only
increased after the American Revolution.
The law of nations was familiar to North Americans even before the
Revolution. Elements of it had long circulated in the colonies. Prize courts
operated during the (frequent) imperial wars. Law of nations treatises were
required reading in the capstone course on moral philosophy in the growing
number of colonial colleges.11 In law offices, many mentors assigned the
literature of the law of nations to their charges, praising it as essential to the
formation of a citizen of the Enlightenment. That does not mean, however,
that all students took it on as such. The law of nations, like most fields of
law, was usually learned as needed. John Adams gives evidence. After
ignoring his esteemed mentor’s advice about the salutary effects of reading
8. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
9. See, e.g., ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2017); Eugene Kontorovich, Originalism and the
Difficulties of History in Foreign Affairs, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 39 (2008).
10. Cf. David Armitage, In Defense of Presentism, in HISTORY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING
(Darrin M. McMahon ed., forthcoming 2021) (on file with authors).
11. Benjamin C. Lyons, John Jay and the Law of Nations in the Diplomacy of the
American Revolution (2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with authors).
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the law of nations during his apprenticeship, Adams put himself on a crash
course in the 1760s to harness the mythic ideal of European confederation as
an argument against parliamentary supremacy.12 Soon the law of nations
became an essential resource for the revolutionaries as they forged a
confederation, converted an imperial rebellion into an international war, and
negotiated alliances and commercial treaties.13
By late 1774, future U.S. attorney general William Bradford wrote college
classmate James Madison that the Continental Congress was meeting in the
same building that held the “City Library . . . of which the Librarian tells me
the Gentlemen make great & constant use.”14 He went on to report “I was
told Vattel, Barlemaqui Locke & Montesquie[u] seem to be the standar[d]s
to which they refer either when settling the rights of the Colonies or when a
dispute arises on the Justice or propriety of a measure.”15 The next year,
Benjamin Franklin received three copies of Emmerich de Vattel’s treatise,
The Law of Nations, from a friend and translator in the Netherlands.16 The
book arrived after the first battles of the Revolution had begun, though before
the Declaration of Independence.17 “It came to us in good season,” Franklin
wrote in his note of thanks, “when the circumstances of a rising state make it
necessary frequently to consult the law of nations.”18 Serving in the Second
Continental Congress, he reported that the book “has been continually in the
hands of the members of our congress, now sitting.”19 It was a book to be
used.
When the delegates turned its pages, what did they find? Vattel’s treatise
is remembered as an influential primer on what is now called international
law. It was that, but it was also much more. Early modern law of nations
treatises were moralistic advice manuals written for statesmen and their
advisors and were intended to be put to work. They descended from a
Renaissance advice book genre known as “mirror for princes.”20 The treatise
writers tried to persuade the prince that it was not primarily his honor and
gain that was at stake in his decisions. The honor and flourishing of the
nation and its people were paramount. In the new United States, there was
no princely sovereign. According to republican theory, sovereignty rested in
12. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Revolutionary Portfolio: Constitution-Making and the
Wider World in the American Revolution, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759, 799–800 (2014).
13. See id.; see also ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 18–20, 79–80, 124–26 (2010).
14. Letter from William Bradford to James Madison (Oct. 17, 1774), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 125, 126 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., ser. 1 1962) (alteration in
original).
15. Id.
16. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Charles-Guillaume-Frédéric Dumas (Dec. 9, 1775),
reprinted in 22 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 287, 287–91 (William B. Willcox ed.,
1982).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Mirror for Presidents: George Washington and the Law of
Nations, in POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 243, 251
(Ben Lowe ed., 2021).
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the people.21 Yet these treatises remained instructive for advisors of the
newly sovereign American people, trying to build a new kind of state.
In his treatise, Vattel detailed the rights and duties of a sovereign. Above
all, the sovereign was supposed to protect his people and avoid war. “The
end or object of civil society,” Vattel argued,
is to procure for the citizens whatever they stand in need of, for the
necessities, the conveniences, the accommodation of life, and, in general,
whatever constitutes happiness,—with the peaceful possession of property,
a method of obtaining justice with security, and, finally a mutual defence
against all external violence.22

The sovereign owed the people the protection of life, liberty, and property—
and happiness.23
More specifically, Vattel divided the rules or “maxims” of sovereign duties
into four categories. Book I of his treatise covered “Of Nations considered
in themselves,” or a nation’s domestic constitution and policies.24 Book II
analyzed “Of a Nation considered in its Relations to others,” or international
relations.25 Book III, “Of War,” discussed when peaceful relations with other
nations failed.26 Book IV, “Of the Restoration of Peace; and of Embassies,”
surveyed treaties and the various categories of diplomatic emissaries.27 The
laws of war, which modern scholars often treat as the centerpiece of the law
of nations, accounted for less than a third of Vattel’s treatise. In comparison,
Part I’s maxims for good government accounted for about the same.
Consequently, Vattel’s book provided as much advice about the best policies
within a nation as it did about peaceful international relations.
The early modern law of nations as the revolutionaries encountered it,
therefore, embraced far more than law between states. It also included
comparative examples indicating how to govern in an “enlightened” manner,
and in this sense was a precursor of modern comparative constitutional law.
It was filled with historical examples, abstract principles, and disagreement
carried out in indirect conversations among jurists, leaders, and not least,
writers who wished to advise leaders and administer their governments. This
dimension was a legacy of the oldest connotation of the law of nations: the
jus gentium, or the law that the Romans claimed was, or should be, common
to all peoples.28 The concept is echoed in the modern international law
notion of jus cogens, as well as in “best practices,” and other aspects of

21. See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 49–57 (1988).
22. EMER DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 86 (Béla Kapossy et al eds., Liberty Fund 2008)
(1758) (emphasis omitted).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 81.
25. Id. at 259.
26. Id. at 469.
27. Id. at 651.
28. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Comment, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119
HARV. L. REV. 129, 133 (2005).
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modern transnational law.29 It was here that the law of nations literature
retained its closest connection to those Renaissance instructional guides, the
most (in)famous—but also most unrepresentative—example of which was
Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince.30 Indeed, Vattel explicitly criticized
Machiavelli for celebrating Caesar Borgia’s “mischievous” policies.31 In
contrast, Vattel instructed the good ruler to promote agriculture, commerce,
education, immigration, and infrastructure that would transport the people
and their goods.32 That infrastructure should include granaries, public
markets, and even banks.33 Sovereigns should also control coinage and
public spending and protect the liberty of religious conscience even if they
established one denomination.34 It was not an exclusive enumeration. Vattel
recommended all these domestic policies, and others, before any mention of
diplomacy. The premise, however, was that good domestic policy
conditioned foreign policy, and the elements of good policy were
transnational. It was the sovereign’s duty to help its subjects reach their
potential, as individuals and together as a nation.35 Then they could
participate productively in the wider world.
Vattel’s book was only one among many, of course, and there was much
more to the law of nations than books. Still, the multidimensionality of his
treatise, its compendium of principles for governance at home and abroad,
and its guidance for promoting interactions between individuals in different
states captured central and, to the founders, attractive aspects of the early
modern law of nations. Although nominally addressed to sovereigns, the real
audience comprised men who would be advisors to the prince, rather than the
prince himself. In a new republic in which the sovereign was an
abstraction—the people themselves—there was a ready audience for a
resource meant to aid those advising others. They could serve the people,
construct the state, and then govern that state, all the while positioning
themselves, at home and abroad, as civilized men of the Enlightenment.
A legal regime is more than a compendium of principles and rules, maxims
and examples. It also conveys a style of reasoning. Early Americans
believed that the law of nations contained a distinct form of legal reasoning
that tended to improve each nation over time: comparative analysis, with the
goal of identifying the best institutions, all to the end of increasing the
sovereign’s reputation.36
As a law that crossed borders and regulated interactions between different
nations and their peoples, the law of nations depended on reflexive self29. See id. at 130–31.
30. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Peter Bondanella trans. & ed., 2005) (1532).
31. VATTEL, supra note 22, at 289.
32. Id. at 128–46.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 142, 156–61.
35. Id. at 126.
36. David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, “The Known Opinion of the Impartial
World”: Foreign Relations and the Law of Nations in The Federalist, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO THE FEDERALIST 114, 124–29 (Jack N. Rakove & Collen A. Sheehan eds.,
2020).
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enforcement within each nation. The motivation was not, however, blind
rule fealty, on the one hand, or fear of retaliation from other nations in the
form of war, on the other. In between habit and fear lay reputation, which in
turn depended on the presumed collective judgment of those nations.
Because nations were only abstractions, the real motor force was the
perceived reputation of a nation’s people. The first line of federal decision
makers was crucial. This helps explain why federal constitution makers
divided and separated foreign affairs powers and why they created a judiciary
more independent from the political branches than those in the states.
Buffered from everyday politics, federal decision makers were supposed to
imagine the response of the civilized world to their policy choices. James
Madison captured this decision-making ethic in Federalist No. 63 when,
defending the six-year tenure of senators, he underscored the importance of
“the national councils . . . possess[ing] that sensibility to the opinion of the
world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to
obtain, its respect and confidence,” adding that “the presumed or known
opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed.”37
Knowledge of the law of nations could not be confined, however, to a
small cadre of federal officials. In a representative republic, the concentric
circles of decision-making expanded beyond government officials to include
ordinary lawyers and even the people themselves. In a republic, all of these
actors had leverage over government personnel or policy. Hence there was
an ambitious project in the early Republic of educating lawyers and the
broader public in the principles and rules encompassed in treaties and the law
of nations. Law teachers like James Wilson, James Kent, and Joseph Story
organized their lectures and treatises around the international and
transnational aspects of the law of nations. They emphasized, as James
Wilson put it, that “[t]o love and to deserve honest fame, is another duty of
the people.”38 Only if the people themselves identified with the nation’s
reputation would they participate in republican governance in the right way.
Doing so was in their collective interest because “[t]he reputation of a state
is not only . . . pleasant, it is also a valuable possession” that is acquired by
the virtue expressed in “the public transactions of the state,” as well as “the
private behavior of its members.”39 Similarly, James Kent instructed
students at Columbia College that “the faithful observance of [the law of
nations] is essential to universal happiness” and that “[i]ts noble aim is to
preserve peace, kind offices, and good faith, amongst mankind in their
national intercourse.”40 Judges and jurists propounded the law of nations in
jury charges and a stream of public print because, again in Wilson’s terms,
“[a] weighty part of the public business is transacted by the citizens at large,”
37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 423 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
38. JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, Part 1, Chapter 4: Of the Law of Nations, reprinted
in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 128, 142 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan
& Co. 1896).
39. Id.
40. JAMES KENT, DISSERTATIONS: BEING THE PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LAW
LECTURES 51 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1795).
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not least in selecting their representatives.41 This didactic effort presumed
that the public sought “general and just knowledge” of the law of nations and
could “form a rational judgment” about how it had been or should be
applied.42 Paradoxically, Wilson observed, the law of nations, though
originally the law of kings in monarchical states, was “of peculiar importance
in free ones,” for “the practice of the law of nations . . . must, in a free
government, depend very considerably on the acts of the citizens.”43 The
constitutional project would only succeed if the people, and not just their
leaders, incorporated the law of nations into their thought and behavior.
III. THE MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN FEDERAL
STATE-BUILDING
The founding generation made use of the law of nations in many ways.
Three areas in which the law of nations played a central role in federal
governance were: structuring its international relations, designing the
structure and institutions of the federal state, and providing the law that
governed an array of transnational legal subjects.
The role of the law of nations in international relations corresponds closely
to the role of modern international law in contemporary international
relations, only the law of nations was conceived of more capaciously. Like
modern international law, the law of nations specified the binding obligations
states owed to one another and framed their diplomacy. Equally important,
however, were its nonbinding rules and maxims. Like the now muchdiscussed role of nonbinding norms in enforcing the spirit of the Constitution,
the law of nations’ maxims were supposed to inform and guide the foreign
policy of nations and help achieve the larger pacific aims of the system. Early
American statesmen and lawyers were fully aware of the difference between
binding and nonbinding obligations, but it is striking how little attention they
paid to the distinction, freely invoking the law of nations in general without,
at least much of the time, noticing the difference.44 This Essay only touches
on the use of the law of nations in this area, not because it is less important
than its use in the others but rather, because it is the most familiar and best
understood of the areas and, therefore, less necessary to develop here.
The role of the law of nations in the second area—constructing the federal
state—is less familiar. Much has been written about the influence of the
41. WILSON, supra note 38, at 128; see also Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as
Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127.
42. WILSON, supra note 38, at 129.
43. Id. at 128–29.
44. On early understandings of the distinction between the binding and nonbinding parts
of the law of nations, see generally William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary
International Law: Some Lessons from History, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 169 (2010); Golove
& Hulsebosch, supra note 36, at 116. For an example of the use of nonbinding, typically
prudential, maxims in debates over foreign policy in the founding era, see Alexander
Hamilton, The Defence No. II, in 18 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 493, 494 (Harold
C. Syrett ed., 1973) (observing that “[w]hen one nation has cause of complaint against another,
the course marked out by practice, the opinion of writers, and the principles of humanity, the
object being to avoid War, is to precede reprisals of any kind by a demand of reparation”).
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common law in the design of the Constitution, but the arguably more
pervasive influence of the law of nations over the Constitution is much less
appreciated. In this area, the founders drew on portions of the law of nations
that resemble what we today call comparative constitutional law but was then
understood as an aspect of the general public law—the part of the law of
nations that conveyed general principles of governance. Whether it was in
designing the mechanisms through which the law of nations and treaties
would be incorporated into municipal law or war would be initiated and
waged or in structuring the federal system in both its vertical and horizontal
dimensions, they turned to the law of nations to guide their thinking.
Finally, the eighteenth-century law of nations included legal principles and
rules governing transactions across national boundaries—transactions that
today would be categorized under private law. These included the law
merchant, the maritime law, the conflict of laws, and parts of the laws of war
governing the conduct of a nation’s own citizens. Here, again, states were
not obligated to adopt and apply these parts of the law of nations, but the
founders expected and intended that in some form they would be applicable
in the new federal system. How that was supposed to work raises many
difficulties in reconstruction, which we do not pursue here. The point we
emphasize is that the adoption of these bodies of law meant that the law of
nations would play an outsize role in regulating even private transactions
between individuals and would consequently be the subject of ongoing
debate, especially in the courts, which were responsible for applying them.
A. The Law of Nations in American Diplomacy and Foreign Policymaking
The role of the law of nations in imposing legal obligations on states in
their interactions—the violation of which rendered them legally
accountable—was central to the conduct of the new nation’s foreign
relations. Although strangely underappreciated in much contemporary
scholarship, this point is neither new nor surprising. Any review of the
debates and discussions about American foreign policy among executive
officials and diplomats, and in Congress and the courts, from the outset of
the American Revolution to the conclusion of the War of 1812—what we
call the “Extended Founding”—leaves no room for debate. The law of
nations appears everywhere—its importance was recognized by all, its
influence on policy and discourse was pervasive, and its veneration among
the Enlightenment-inspired and increasingly legally fluent political class was
sometimes over the top.
That discussion and debate about the law of nations appeared so centrally
in the early Republic’s foreign policy crises should seem revelatory only to
those whose experience in foreign affairs is limited to recent decades, when
so many government officials and legislators—and even judges—express
antipathy and contempt for international law. Indeed, the law of nations
played a critical role in each of the new country’s many foreign policy
challenges, including the early effort to conclude a military alliance with
France during the American Revolution; the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great
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Britain; the humiliations that American diplomats suffered in Europe; the
crisis over state violations of the Treaty of Peace under the Confederation
government that provided a crucial prompt for the convening of the
Philadelphia Convention; the first major foreign policy crisis after adoption
of the Constitution—the so-called Nootka Sound affair; the Neutrality Crisis
of 1793, in which the fate of the French alliance seemed to turn on the
interpretation of an “ill-understood scrap in Vattel”;45 the Louisiana
Purchase; and the long decade of disputes with Great Britain over
impressment and American neutral rights that culminated in the War of
1812.46 The law of nations was front and center in each of these challenges,
providing not only the system of rules within which the nation was obliged
to proceed as it sought to advance its interests and ideals but also the precepts,
maxims, and forms of discourse for conducting diplomacy and for debating
among themselves the policy decisions with which they were confronted.
When considering foreign relations, federal officials in the executive branch,
Congress, and the federal judiciary turned continually to the law of nations
to locate governing rules and principles to guide them whenever international
questions arose in their respective domains.47 Measuring federal decisionmaking against the law of nations was pervasive and uncontroversial.
B. Constitutional Construction and the Law of Nations as the Public Law
of the Civilized World
In addition to its central role in international affairs, the law of nations
played a pervasive role in the construction of the federal state. The founders
wished to ensure that the federal government was fully empowered to act the
part of a civilized nation.48 In the first instance, that meant resorting to the
law of nations for aid in developing institutional mechanisms, sometimes
quite innovative, to ensure that the United States would conduct itself in
accordance with the standards demanded by the European state system.49
45. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Apr. 28, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS
supra note 14, at 10, 10.
46. For discussions of these various controversies, see generally BRADFORD PERKINS,
PROLOGUE TO WAR: ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES, 1805–1812 (1961); ROBERT W.
TUCKER & DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: THE STATECRAFT OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON (1990).
47. For a small sample of the literature discussing portions of the relevant history, see
generally MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE SUPREME
COURT SHOULD RULE IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2019); Kevin Arlyck, The Courts and
Foreign Affairs at the Founding, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1; Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2;
Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign Official Immunity, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
704 (2012); Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as a Quasi-international
Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based
Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765 (2004); Robert J. Reinstein,
Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington Administration, 46 U. RICH. L.
REV. 373 (2012); David L. Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 145 (2008).
48. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2.
49. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Law of Nations and the
Constitution: An Early Modern Perspective, 106 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1616–23 (2018).
OF JAMES MADISON,
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The founders were concerned not only with incorporating these aspects of
the law of nations into the very definition of the granted powers, thereby
making the law of nations part of the law of the land, but also with developing
institutional arrangements that would facilitate its enforcement.50
More broadly, when envisioning how to structure their own complex
polity, the founders reached reflexively for assistance to resources in the law
of nations. In this respect, the law of nations did not purport to offer binding
mandates for states. Instead, it consisted of an amorphous body of learning
and examples derived from the publicists on the law of nations,
Enlightenment philosophers and theorists, and the evolving customs, or best
practices, of “civilized nations.” As a kind of comparative public or
constitutional law, it yielded concepts, principles, maxims, and discourses
supposed to guide the organization and administration of an effective and just
state.
Those resources were not relevant only with respect to institutional
arrangements for the conduct of foreign relations. In this dimension, the law
of nations had an open-ended quality, which left room for considerable
variation in practice and for developing its principles. American statesmen
drew from these ideas and discourses in designing and implementing many
of the fundamental structural arrangements in the Constitution and, at the
same time, viewed themselves as contributing to its progressive
development. They extolled the advances in understanding reflected in the
law of nations but also insisted that the American Revolution had generated
advances in political thinking, derived mostly from republicanism.
1. The Incorporation of the Law of Nations into American Municipal Law
In this section, we explore some of the mechanisms by which the founders
sought to ensure that the new nation would comply with its international legal
obligations, and we emphasize how they drew inspiration from the law of
nations in carrying out this part of their plan.
a. Direct Incorporation of the Law of Nations into the Constitutional Text
Less well appreciated than the role of the law of nations in American
foreign policy is the extent to which the founders incorporated its principles
and institutions into the text of the Constitution. This incorporation signaled
to a watchful international audience the nation’s commitment to uphold its
legal duties, exercise concomitant national powers, and embrace the role of
a civilized nation. Famously, the term “law of nations” only appears once in
the text—in the relatively obscure Offenses Clause—which grants Congress
the power “[t]o define and Punish . . . Offences against the Law of
Nations.”51 This textual lacuna has provided the grounds in modern
constitutional law for the diminishing constitutional status of the law of
50. See id. at 1624–29.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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nations, which has accompanied the rise of the United States as a
superpower.52
In fact, viewed in historical perspective, the text is filled with references
to the law of nations, which, like cognate references to the common law (such
as the “jury” trial),53 were meant to incorporate the bodies of law to which
they referred. The term “treaties” in the Treaty Clause,54 for example, was
manifestly borrowed from the law of nations,55 and it was not only a grant of
power to make the kinds of treaties deemed permissible in the law of nations
but also an incorporation of the international law of treaties, with its welladumbrated rules for treaty interpretation, breach, force majeure,
countermeasures, and so on. Similarly, Congress’s power “[t]o declare
War”56 and the president’s role as “Commander in Chief,”57—terms again
drawn from the law of nations—were not only specifications of the branch
with authority to exercise these functions but incorporations of the laws of
war and neutrality into the municipal law of the United States.58
Another example is the Constitution’s grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the
federal courts,59 which was a reference, in part, to the law of nations
institution of prize courts and to the body of law they were charged by the
law of nations to apply. Prize courts were among the most important
institutions of the law of nations, holding out a promise that in wartime
belligerents would accord fair treatment equally to all neutral nations by
faithfully executing the laws of war and neutrality.60 In this respect, the
institution reflected the larger pacific aspirations of the law of nations to
minimize and limit the scope of war. By mandating that civilized nations
maintain prize tribunals that would apply the law of nations in resolving
disputes over neutral rights, the law of nations discouraged belligerent
nations from engaging in conduct that would inevitably draw neutral nations
into their conflicts and expand the scope of war.61 Evidencing the
52. For discussion, see supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
54. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
55. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 1000; David M. Golove, Treaty-Making
and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty
Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1089 (2000).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
57. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
58. For discussion, see Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 1000. Much the same
applies to the text’s references to Congress’s power to issue “Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”
to make “Rules concerning Captures,” “to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations,” and to regulate “Commerce with
foreign Nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 10–11. It applies as well to the president’s
powers to “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls” and to “receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.” Id. art. II, §§ 2–3. These terms were taken from
the law of nations—in particular from Vattel’s treatise—and each thereby incorporated
relevant portions of the law of nations into the very definition of the powers granted as well
as into the municipal law of the United States.
59. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
60. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 1001–04.
61. On the history of prize courts, see, for example, PHILLIP C. JESSUP & FRANCIS DEAK,
1 NEUTRALITY: ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW (1935); see also KENT, supra note 40, at
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international basis of prize law, the founders simply extended the judicial
power to admiralty and maritime cases without including a corresponding
power in Congress to provide or alter the substantive law the courts would
apply.62 The relevant jurisprudence was not supposed to be subject to
municipal amendment.
Sir William Scott captured the premise underlying the institution of prize
courts when he declared in 1799 that they do not
deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of
particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice
which the law of nations holds out without distinction to independent states,
some happening to be neutral, and some to be belligerent. The seat of
judicial authority is, indeed, locally here in the belligerent country,
according to the known law and practice of nations: but the law itself has
no locality.63

Americans eagerly embraced the sentiment. Immediately after the
Revolution commenced, the Confederation created a complicated prize court
system, partly state and partly federal in character.64 The Constitution
regularized those courts and gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over
all prize proceedings. Thereafter, following established international
practice, the federal courts uniformly applied the law of nations as their rules
of decision in prize proceedings.65
The Confederation’s approach to prize adjudication was, in one respect, in
tension with international practice. It had permitted the use of juries in
deciding prize cases, a revolutionary experiment that was not countenanced
by European nations, including Great Britain, and indeed, was roundly
decried as a failure.66 In response, the Constitution’s drafters left Congress
discretion over the use of civil jury trials in the federal courts, expecting it
would employ them widely but not, for example, in prize proceedings.67 As
Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 83, the need for this
68 (observing that the “excesses” of privateering are “endeavoured to be checked by requiring
security from the owners of privateers, and rendering some judicial condemnation of the
property captured requisite to complete transfer”).
62. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 1002–04.
63. The Maria (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 199, 202, 1 C. Rob. 340, 350 (emphasis omitted).
Justice Joseph Story, the nation’s leading prize jurist, expressed the same view: “The Court
of prize is emphatically a Court of the law of nations; and it takes neither its character nor its
rules from the mere municipal regulations of any country.” The Schooner Adeline, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 244, 284 (1815). At the height of the Napoleonic Wars, federal district judge Richard
Peters and minister to Britain Rufus King arranged and subsidized the republication of Scott’s
admiralty reports in the United States precisely to instruct American merchants and lawyers
in the law and practice of prize jurisdiction. See John D. Gordan III, Publishing Robinson’s
Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Admiralty, 32 LAW & HIST.
REV. 525 (2014).
64. For a history of the Confederation prize courts, see generally HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON,
THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 1775–1787 (1977); see also Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 1004–05.
65. For discussion, see Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 1001–05.
66. See id. at 1104–05.
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 37, at 559–61, 568–69 (Alexander Hamilton).
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discretion was directly connected to the law of nations.68 Some kinds of
cases turned “wholly on the laws of nations.”69 But juries could not “be
supposed competent to investigations, that require a thorough knowledge of
the laws and usages of nations.”70 More pointedly, he added, they would
“sometimes be under the influence of impressions” that would bias their
inquiries, creating the “danger that the rights of other nations might be
infringed by their decisions, so as to afford occasions of reprisal and war.”71
Accordingly, in defending the absence of a guarantee of a jury trial in all civil
cases against anti-Federalist criticism during the ratifying debate, Hamilton
observed that:
It will add great weight to this remark in relation to prize causes to mention
that the method of determining them has been thought worthy of particular
regulation in various treaties between different powers of Europe, and that
pursuant to such treaties they are determinable in Great Britain in the last
resort before the king himself in his privy council, where the fact as well as
the law undergoes a re-examination.72

This point “alone demonstrates,” he insisted, “the impolicy” of including in
the Constitution a right to a jury trial in civil cases.73
The Seventh Amendment reversed the Framers’ initial judgment, but only
partially and with regard for Hamilton’s point: the amendment extended the
civil jury trial right only to “Suits at common law,”74 leaving intact the
discretion Hamilton defended for the kinds of cases he identified as most
clearly in tension with the principles and practices of other civilized
nations—in particular, admiralty cases.
b. The Incorporation Doctrine: The Law of Nations as Law of the Land
and Self-Executing Treaties
The founders also created a series of innovative institutional mechanisms
designed to encourage the nation to comply with its law-of-nations
obligations and fulfill its treaty commitments. Although not mandated by the
law of nations, which mostly left internal political arrangements to the
discretion of each nation-state, these mechanisms were nevertheless drawn
from the law of nations in its more capacious sense, including its principles
for the effective management of a state’s foreign relations. When designing
and implementing these innovations, the founders self-consciously resorted
to ideas and concepts of the law of nations.
Though comprising the great bulk of litigated cases arising under the law
of nations during the founding period, prize was nevertheless a special
category. With respect to other areas—for instance, the rights of foreign
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 568.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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ambassadors—there were few directory principles in the law of nations that
specified the mechanisms by which its rules were to be made enforceable as
municipal law in every nation. The law of nations provided rules of decision,
not rules of jurisdiction and institutions of enforcement.75 Nevertheless,
European practice was not silent on the matter. As Chief Justice John Jay
emphasized as early as 1790, “the Laws of Nations make Part of the Laws of
this, and of every other civilized Nation.”76 English constitutional practice
was in accord, as reflected in Lord Mansfield’s holding that “the law of
nations, in its full extent was part of the law of England”77 and Blackstone’s
dictum that the law of nations “is here adopted in it’s [sic] full extent by the
common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.”78
From the beginning—even during the Confederation—American courts
administered the law of nations in cases falling within their jurisdiction.79
They followed European custom when doing so, but they also claimed to
improve on the European model and thereby to make another contribution to
the law of nations.80 Most pointedly, as American statesmen would
emphasize over the next several decades, federal court judges, in contrast to
their English (and other European) counterparts, were independent of the
executive branch and enjoyed life tenure. This status, Americans argued,
made their courts more likely to be impartial interpreters of the law of
nations, capable of resisting the influence of executive officials, popular
75. The law of nations did insist, however, that when one of its citizens violated the rights
of another country under the law of nations, including the laws of war, that nation was bound
either to prosecute or extradite the perpetrator or risk being held responsible for the
misconduct. VATTEL, supra note 22, at 300–01. This understanding was pervasive in the lawof-nations literature at the time. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68.
76. John Jay’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York
(Apr. 12, 1790), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789–1800, at 25, 29 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1988) (emphasis added). A leading
commentator of the era put this commonly expressed understanding succinctly, noting that
“[t]he law of nations, being the common law of the civilised world, may be said, indeed, to be
a part of the law of every civilised nation.” PETER S. DU PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 n.*
(Philadelphia, Abraham Small 1824).
77. Triquet v. Bath (1764) 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 938, 3 Burr. 1478, 1482 (quoting Barbuit’s
Case (1737) 25 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 n.1).
78. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *67.
79. For discussion, see Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 49, at 1612–33. As to federal
jurisdiction over prize cases, see generally BOURGUIGNON, supra note 64.
80. In one respect, however, some early American lawyers followed the English approach
too literally, repeating Blackstone’s dictum that the law of nations was part of the common
law in explaining why it was also part of the law of the United States. Blackstone had not
meant to weaken the authority of the law of nations in English law by so claiming. He was
not making a point about the hierarchical status of the law of nations in English law but, rather,
asserting the authority of the common-law courts, like the admiralty courts and the Privy
Council, to apply the law of nations when their jurisdiction was invoked and the law of nations
was applicable. Indeed, in the Commentaries, Blackstone was emphatic about the higher law
status of the law of nations, in part based on its natural law foundations but more generally as
the law applicable to all sovereign states. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *66–67. The
frequent repetition of Blackstone’s dictum in the United States, however, associated the law
of nations with the common law in the minds of American lawyers and later created the
potential for confusion when the dispute over the federal common law became salient.

1858

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

opinion, and national prejudice.81 To some, the English judge’s robe was
just a cover to hide the Englishman beneath.82 In contrast, the American
judiciary offered the promise of a new era in which the law of nations could
be administered fairly, even by national courts.
The most innovative feature of the founders’ plan and another American
contribution to the evolving law of nations was the doctrine that treaties were
self-executing and did not require legislative implementation. Self-execution
arose out of the experience with treaty noncompliance during the
Confederation and was designed to facilitate treaties’ implementation by
assigning the task to the courts through the equally innovative institution of
judicial review.83 Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had the
power to make treaties.84 However, Congress lacked the power to enforce
treaties or to force the states to do so.85 Many of the states assumed that they
could, for example, pass retaliatory measures against Britain for what they
perceived as violations of the Treaty of Peace. In short, many state
legislatures claimed the sovereign power to interpret treaties and retaliate for
perceived infractions.86 Britain, of course, rejected the states’ claims, lodged
its own complaints about American noncompliance, and most importantly,
determined that because Congress lacked the power to address these issues,
there was no point in dealing with American diplomats who were incapable
of representing thirteen different sovereigns.87 The Confederation’s
fragmentation thus obstructed negotiations to resolve these differences.
Similar problems marred treaties with Native American nations. The
simultaneous attempts by New York State and the Confederation Congress
to negotiate with the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix in 1784 was perhaps the most
catastrophic example.88 It was not only a problem of the authority to make
treaties with Native Americans (which was at least textually ambiguous
under the Articles),89 it was also a problem of enforcing them, as the federal
government had to rely on the restraint of the state governments claiming

81. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 949–70.
82. See, e.g., The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 299 (1814) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(declaring that “I respect sir William Scott, as I do every truely great man; . . . but it is
impossible to consider them attentively, without perceiving that his mind leans strongly in
favor of the captors”); see also WILLIAM BARTON, A DISSERTATION ON THE FREEDOM OF
NAVIGATION AND MARITIME COMMERCE 246 n.* (Philadelphia, John Conrad & Co. 1802)
(asserting that “the judges of [the English courts of admiralty] have been commanded by the
crown to conform their . . . cases, to the royal instructions, issued from time to time to the
commanders of British armed ships of war”).
83. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 994–1000.
84. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. VI, IX.
85. We analyze these problems in Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 957–59.
86. See id. at 949–70.
87. See id.
88. Jack Campisi, From Stanwix to Canandaigua: National Policy, States’ Rights and
Indian Land, in IROQUOIS LAND CLAIMS 49–52 (Christopher Vescey & William A. Starna eds.,
1988).
89. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX (granting the “united states in
congress assembled” the “sole and exclusive right and power of . . . managing all affairs with
the indians”).
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local jurisdiction over the relevant territory. In land-hungry New York and
Georgia, that restraint was absent.90
Faced with the deteriorating international reputation of the United States,
many incipient Federalists sought to emphasize the principle pacta sunt
servanda—treaties must be observed—to urge constitutional reform.91 This
was an uncontroversial principle of the law of nations. But the Federalists
added that treaties were also the law of the land, operating throughout the
American states and overriding state laws to the contrary.92 In contrast to the
practice in Britain, the Federalists insisted that the Confederation’s treaties
became the law of the land immediately upon ratification by Congress,
without the need for any confirmatory legislation.93 To preserve the sanctity
of international treaty commitments, the doctrine of self-execution was born.
The doctrine emerged in a handful of judicial cases in the 1780s, and
Secretary for Foreign Affairs John Jay stated it clearly in 1786 in his report
on state violations of the Treaty of Peace.94 The drafters of the new
Constitution then institutionalized it in the Supremacy Clause.95
In justifying this central aspect of the Constitution’s institutional
arrangements, Federalists invoked the law of nations and the practices of
other civilized nations. This move was problematic because self-execution
was so innovative. However, it was necessary in a republic, whose
representative legislatures were prone to be led astray by demagogues who,
to promote their own interests, would appeal to national partialities to whip
up hostility to foreign powers and their claims on the United States. In
contrast, the anti-Federalists, correctly perceiving that self-execution
eliminated any popular legislative brake on treaty making by excluding not
only the state legislatures but also the House of Representatives, made selfexecution a prime target for their opposition.96
The Federalists replied by attempting to demonstrate that their innovation
was rooted in the principles of the law of nations. When anti-Federalists
protested that, in republics, legislation was the supreme law, Jay responded
that the principle of pacta sunt servanda simply could not survive such
thinking, stating:
These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name
for a bargain; and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would
make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but
on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it.97

90. See J. David Lehman, The End of the Iroquois Mystique: The Oneida Land Cession
Treaties of the 1780s, 47 WM. & MARY Q. 523, 527–29 (1990). See generally LISA FORD,
SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA,
1788–1836 (2010); Campisi, supra note 88.
91. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 49, at 1609–10.
92. See, e.g., Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 995–99.
93. See id. at 995.
94. See id. at 964, 967–69, 995–96.
95. See generally id. at 995–99.
96. See id. at 997.
97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 37, at 436–37 (John Jay).
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The Constitution’s solution to ensuring treaty compliance was thus necessary
to enable the United States to fulfill its obligations as a civilized nation and,
in this respect, perfectly in accord with international expectations and
practice: “[t]he proposed Constitution therefore has not in the least extended
the obligation of treaties,” Jay noted.98 “They are just as binding, and just as
far beyond the lawful reach of the legislative acts now, as they will be at any
future period, or under any form of government.”99
With the adoption of the Constitution, the understanding that treaties were
the law of the land automatically upon ratification achieved widespread
acceptance in George Washington’s cabinet, Congress, and the courts.100 By
the mid-1790s, however, that consensus began to unravel. The outbreak of
the French revolutionary wars in 1792; the spread to America of increasingly
radical French republican ideology, reflected in the passage of the French
Constitution of 1793, which lodged the power to ratify treaties in the national
legislature;101 and the simple fact that while the Federalists controlled the
Senate, Republicans controlled the House102—all of these developments
catalyzed a radical change in the way that Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
and their followers in Congress and the states began to view the treaty
power.103
The Jay Treaty crisis of 1795–96 brought the issue to a head. Under
Jefferson’s leadership, Republicans launched an all-out constitutional assault
on the treaty power, insisting alternately that the power be eviscerated or that
the House of Representatives be accorded a seat at the table. Their most farreaching constitutional argument was that treaties could touch on no subject
that fell within Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers, an argument that
plainly gutted the treaty power of any force.104 Jefferson captured the spirit
of the Republican position, observing wryly that some “denied [this position]
on the ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty power to
work on. The less the better, say others.”105
Republicans found themselves caught on the horns of a constitutional
dilemma. Their position that the House had a right to participate in the treaty98. Id. at 437.
99. Id.
100. On the role of the courts in adjudicating law-of-nations and treaty cases, see generally
Ariel N. Lavinbuck, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855 (2005); see also Arlyck,
supra note 47.
101. 1793 CONST. 55 (Fr.). Though it never went into effect, the Girondin constitution
circulated throughout early America. See, e.g., The Whole of the New Constitution of France,
DUNLAP’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 9, 1793 (Supp.) (printing the text of the French
Constitution of 1793 the day after it was received from Paris).
102. See David Golove, The American Founding and Global Justice: Hamiltonian and
Jeffersonian Approaches, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 621, 642 (2018).
103. For discussion, see id. at 646–48.
104. On the Republican constitutional arguments, see Golove, supra note 55, at 1164–68;
see also Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 1044–46.
105. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: FOR THE USE OF THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 170 (Washington D.C., Joseph Milligan & William Cooper
2d. ed 1812) (1801).
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making process lacked credibility because the Constitution’s text granted the
treaty power to the president by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds
of the Senate.106 This led them to concede that the House could not
participate in the treaty-making process but to assert instead a role for the
House in implementing treaties that the president and Senate had already
made if they touched on subjects within Congress’s Article I powers. This
position rejected the self-executing treaty doctrine, but it left them vulnerable
to the counterargument that they were, in essence, asserting a right of the
House to violate the principle of pacta sunt servanda.107 What else would
the House be doing if it refused to implement a treaty the president and
Senate had validly concluded? But that was a position that Republicans were
unwilling to avow. No one believed that treaties could be treated so
cavalierly.108
Although they were unable to find a way out of this dilemma, Republicans
nevertheless persisted in insisting that treaties that touched on a subject
within Congress’s Article I powers were not self-executing and required the
consent of the House before they became valid treaties and the supreme law
of the land. The exclusion of the House, and therefore the people’s
representatives, was simply unacceptable, as the Jay Treaty—which they
charged was an abandonment of the nation’s republican commitments on a
global scale and a national humiliation—tragically illustrated.109
Republicans did not only rely on these principles as a matter of abstract
political theory but harnessed them to their own version of republicaninfused law-of-nations reasoning. Rejecting Publius’s contention that the
House’s composition and structure made it unfit to review and ratify
treaties,110 Jefferson claimed that “subjecting [treaties] to the ratification of
the Representatives” would be “no more inconvenient than to the Senate”111
and further emphasized the recent post–French Revolution practice of
European nations, asserting that, “[i]n all countries, I believe, except
England, treaties are made by the legislative power.”112 Moreover, even in
England, if treaties “touch the laws of the land, they must be approved by
Parliament.”113
Republicans strenuously pressed this comparative point, emphasizing how
self-execution would make the Constitution even less republican than the
English Constitution and the House of Representatives inferior to the House
of Commons.114 In response, the Federalists pressed their own version of
law-of-nations reasoning, countering the Republicans’ efforts at comparative
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 1050–52.
For further discussion, see id. at 1047–52.
See id. at 1044–52.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 37, at 435–38 (John Jay); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 37, at 506–07 (Alexander Hamilton).
111. JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 170.
112. Id. at 168.
113. Id. at 168–69.
114. This point was stressed by Representative Albert Gallatin during the House debates
on the Jay Treaty. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 469–72 (1796).
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constitutional law by pointing to the disanalogies between the British and
American systems. The president was an elected official, unlike the king of
Great Britain; under the English parliamentary system, as opposed to the
American separation of powers system, the same party necessarily controlled
both the ministries and the Commons; and, in contrast to the unilateral royal
power to make treaties, the Senate not only participated with the president in
the treaty-making approval process but did so under a supermajoritarian
voting rule.115 In designing the treaty power, the founders, the Federalists
observed, had not been inattentive to republican principles or to the principles
and practices of the law of nations.116 In contrast, the British system was
arrived at not through a deliberative and reasoned process of decision but as
the contingent outcome of the long historical struggle of the Commons to
diminish the Crown’s prerogative powers.117
Ultimately, the Republicans failed to remodel the Constitution. Just as the
House was wrapping up its debate over the Jay Treaty, the U.S. Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Ware v. Hylton.118 The decision made clear
that the Justices unanimously viewed the self-executing treaty doctrine as
constitutionally mandated.119 Nevertheless, the Jay Treaty debate cast a long
shadow, and presidents and Senates were sometimes forced to acquiesce in
the House’s participation in the treaty-making process when core
congressional powers were engaged. The Republican critique was absorbed
into the constitutional system, if not as constitutional doctrine, then as a
working political consensus.
c. Congressional Power over War and Peace
Few provisions in the Constitution reflect the comparative public law
dimension of the law of nations more fully than the power to declare war.120
Warmaking was a defining power of legitimate nations, the ultimate means
by which a state could enforce its legal rights. The aspirational commitments
of the law of nations, however, were pacific. They were based on the ideal
of a cooperative international order in which diverse nations, with different
political orders, could coexist in harmony and flourish individually. Thus,
while recognizing the necessity of war, the law of nations sought to
discourage it and limit its scope and destructive potential. As Vattel put it:
“Those things which have a tendency to promote peace are favourable; those
that lead to war are odious.”121
Nor was the law of nations silent on how states should structure their
internal arrangements for deciding questions of war and peace. For example,
it enjoined states to vest the decision to engage in military conflict
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 684, 698–700 (statement of Rep. William Vans Murray).
See id.
See id.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
See id. at 277.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
See VATTEL, supra note 22, at 435.
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exclusively in the sovereign power and to prohibit citizens from engaging in
hostilities without authorization, punishing those who might violate this
principle.122 Nevertheless, as a general matter, the law of nations left
nations’ internal arrangements dealing with the warmaking power to the
determination of municipal law.
In vesting the power to declare war in Congress, the founders were
engaging with these fundamental premises of the law of nations.123
Madison’s early essay, “Universal Peace,” made this point explicit.124
Trumpeting the American constitutional solution to the scourge of war,
Madison considered the problem in dialogue with the utopian writings of the
European universal peace tradition, the Scottish realists Adam Smith and
David Hume, and the republican theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The
Americans, Madison maintained, had discovered the most realistic and
efficacious mechanism ever proposed for promoting universal peace, which
was also a fundamental tenet of republicanism: removing the power of war
and peace from the executive and placing it in the hands of the people’s
representatives in Congress.125 They had thereby provided a model, which
“[h]ad Rousseau lived to see the rapid progress of reason and reformation,
which the present day exhibits, the philanthropy which dictated his project
would find a rich enjoyment in the scene before him;”126 which revolutionary
France had wisely adopted;127 and which, “[w]ere all nations to follow . . .
the temple of Janus might be shut, never to be opened more.”128
2. The Law of Nations and the Construction of Federalism
The usefulness of the law of nations to the project of constructing a federal
state was pervasive—and peculiarly so—as the founding generation
struggled to conceive of, and construct, its federal system. The Articles of
Confederation were widely conceived to be a treaty arrangement creating a
confederation, a recognized form of the law of nations.129 The confederal
form consisted of a central authority with given powers—usually, in that era,
focusing on security and defense—but left intact the sovereignty, and the
power of internal governance, of the member states.130 Except as modified
by the treaty, moreover, the member states continued to regulate their
relations by the principles of the law of nations.131

122. See id. at 298–301.
123. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 1012–14.
124. See generally James Madison, Universal Peace, NAT’L GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1792,
reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 14, at 206, 206–09.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 208.
127. Indeed, “[h]ad Rousseau lived to see the constitution of the United States and of
France,” he too would have recognized the error in his own thinking on the subject. Id. at 207.
128. Id. at 208.
129. See David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1706–07 (2003).
130. Id. at 1707.
131. See id. at 1703–10.
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To a surprising extent, the confederal model also informed the more novel
“Union” created by the Constitution.132 This made the law of nations highly
relevant in shaping the Constitution, including even in the structuring of the
ratification process (by conventions rather than by submission to state
legislatures).133 It also meant that any modification of the default rules of
the law of nations applying to relations among the states had to be—and in
some cases, like the Interstate Extradition and the Fugitive Slave Clauses,
were—included in the text. It also meant that the law of nations would be of
critical importance in defining the relationships among the states going
forward.
a. Vertical Federalism: The Legacy of Confederal Thought
The very term “federal” (like “nation”) is derived from the law of
nations.134 When drafting both the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution, moreover, the founders drew from Montesquieu’s ideas about
the confederal form and existing examples of confederations, as in the
Netherlands and Switzerland. In The Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu promoted
the idea of small republics joining together in a league for mutual defense
and security while still retaining their internal liberty,135 an idea also
embraced by Vattel and Samuel von Pufendorf.136 This became the
fundamental premise of the American federal order.137
If the imperative of mutual defense prompted the founders to create the
Confederation, it was the foreign policy frustrations of the Confederation that
led to the Philadelphia Convention. Most critically, the impetus was the
Confederation’s inability to rein in the states, which repeatedly violated the
Confederation’s treaties and the law of nations. As Hamilton decried in his
first bill of particulars against the Confederation: “Are there engagements,
to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men?
These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation.”138 The result
was a nation that had “reached almost the last stage of national humiliation.
There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or degrade the character
of an independent nation, which we do not experience.”139 The need to
ensure that the United States would uphold its international commitments
and act the part of a civilized nation was the motivating force behind

132. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
133. See id. art. VII.
134. See Golove, supra note 129, at 1704.
135. See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 185–87 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
New York, The Colonial Press rev. ed. 1899) (1752).
136. See VATTEL, supra note 22, at 84; see also 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE
ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 1046–52 (C. H. Oldfather & W. A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688).
137. See DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING 28–29 (2003).
138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 37, at 91 (Alexander Hamilton).
139. Id.
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constitutional reform and the newly enhanced powers of the federal
government.140
The Constitution’s effort to form “a more perfect Union”141 was less a
rejection of the fundamental Montesquieuian idea of a complex polity than
an attempt to improve it in light of experience with the states’ foreign policy
failures. And to defend the Constitution’s strengthening of the confederal
model, Federalists again had recourse to literature of the law of nations.
Hamilton, for example, drew from the writings of the Abbé de Mably, who
was among the most insightful writers in the law of nations tradition, to argue
that a more integrated union was necessary to avoid conflict and even war
among the states.142 When warning of the disastrous consequences of
disunion, Federalists did not claim that Americans were obliged to follow
Montesquieu’s models or Mably’s insights. They selected among and
modified the received learning. The point, however, is that the law of nations
provided them with useful resources for state making, and its leading
exponents were esteemed authorities whose wisdom was taken seriously, if
not followed by rote. Moreover, they imagined that their innovations would
in turn provide a model for other nations to follow, as Benjamin Franklin
explained to a European correspondent after the conclusion of the
Philadelphia Convention: “I do not see why you might not in Europe carry
the project of good Henry the Fourth into execution, by forming a federal
union and one grand republic of all the different states and kingdoms, by
means of a like convention, for we had many interests to reconcile.”143
Nor did the importance of the confederal model disappear after ratification.
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson again drew on international
jurisprudence a dozen years later when advocating the “compact” theory of
the Constitution in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions,144 which John C.
Calhoun and other Southerners later elaborated during the antebellum era.145
Traces of the theory still influence constitutional thought today.146
b. Horizontal Federalism: The Law of Nations and Default Relations
Among the States
That the law of nations provided models and concepts for building and
understanding the federal government should, on reflection, be easily
understandable. The law of nations was, after all, concerned with the
140. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 2, at 945–48.
141. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
142. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, supra note 37, at 35–36 (Alexander Hamilton).
143. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Rodolphe-Ferdinand Grand (Oct. 22, 1787), in 32
THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, supra note 16, at 180.
144. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, The Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800), reprinted in 17 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 14, at 303, 308–12.
145. See generally Stephen C. Neff, Secession and Breach of Compact: The Law of Nature
Meets the United States Constitution, 45 AKRON L. REV. 405 (2012).
146. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846–50 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (relying in part on the compact theory to state that the power to restrict
congressional eligibility lies only with the people of each independent state).
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meaning of political nationhood. More surprising is the role it played in
defining the relations among the states in the federal system—what is today
called horizontal federalism.
Consistent with the practice of treaty-based confederations, Article II of
the Articles of Confederation declared that, except as “expressly” agreed
otherwise, “[e]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence,
and every power, jurisdiction and right.”147 One implication of this
reservation was that, notwithstanding their treaty of confederation, the states
continued to relate to one another as independent sovereigns. A further
implication was that the default rule for determining their rights and
obligations toward one another, except as modified by the Articles, was the
law of nations.
The Constitution as originally drafted did not include a similar provision,
but the Tenth Amendment reintroduced a similar notion in more ambiguous
language.148 The deep question of how far the Constitution went in creating
a nation, as opposed to merely strengthening a more limited union among the
states, has been the source of endless controversy among historians,
constitutional lawyers, and political leaders throughout U.S. history.149 Yet,
the implication that the relations among the states would be governed by the
law of nations was never especially controversial.
The quasi-international relationship between the individual states was to
be implemented, at least in part, through Article III of the Constitution’s grant
of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in “controversies between two
or more States.”150 The states could, like nations, negotiate settlements or
compacts with each other, although they needed federal approval.151
However, Article III encouraged them to submit bilateral disputes to
courts.152 Here was yet another innovation on the law of nations: nations
were not required to submit their controversies to a court but were limited to
negotiation or war as the only means of resolving their disputes. That made
international relations a perilous realm in which might, not right, threatened
to decide controversies. Among the American states, however, a different
method, based on law and impartial adjudication, would prevail, and it later
provided a model for reforming international law.
The Constitution did not only refer implicitly to the law of nations in
structuring state-to-state disputes. That law also defined claims of state
power and individual right against the backdrop of early modern
understandings of the legislative competence of states. Leading examples
are found in Article IV. The Interstate Extradition Clause, for example,
mandates that fugitives from justice in one state found in another must be

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See generally HENDRICKSON, supra note 137.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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“delivered up” to the former.153 That provision, written in the language of
the law of nations,154 was added because of the background rule that each
nation’s jurisdiction was exclusive within its own territory and therefore no
nation was obligated to extradite fugitives to another. Instead, early modern
nations sometimes consented to extradition in bilateral treaties. In other
words, the Interstate Extradition Clause reflects the founding assumption that
the law of nations would govern the relationship between individual states in
the absence of an explicit provision to the contrary in the Constitution.155
A similar explanation elucidates the Constitution’s treatment of slavery,
especially the Fugitive Slave Clause.156 Debate in Europe and the Americas
over the legitimacy and morality of slavery gained momentum during the
eighteenth century.157 The deaccessioning of slavery from the law of nations,
in particular, was energized by Lord Mansfield’s 1772 decision in Somerset
v. Stewart158 (Somerset’s Case),which proclaimed that slavery could not be
reconciled with the law of nature but depended instead on the positive
municipal law of a particular locality for its existence.159 Mansfield, chief
justice of the Court of King’s Bench, tied this conception of slavery to the
law of nations’ principles of comity (now classified as private international
law).160 On what became a widely acknowledged understanding of the
decision in the then British colonies in North America, the law of nations
permitted one jurisdiction to refuse recognition of the effect of slavery in
another. The customary recognition of comity for property rights did not
apply in the case of slavery.161
One critical entailment of Somerset’s Case from the perspective of
American constitution makers a decade later was that, under the law of
nations, an enslaved person who entered free territory was no longer subject
to the law of slavery of the state from which she came.162 How far the law
of that “foreign” state would be respected depended on the local law of the
forum state. Southern slave owners at the Constitutional Convention
153. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. The Articles of Confederation contained a nearly identical
provision. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV.
154. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. 27, Nov. 19,
1794, 8 Stat. 116 [hereinafter The Jay Treaty] (providing the United States and Great Britain
“will deliver up to Justice” fugitives found within the jurisdiction of each).
155. There were conflicting opinions on the issue of extradition, with some treatise writers
maintaining that at least in some cases it was mandatory. The generally prevailing view—and
the one adopted in the United States—denied that position. See 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A
TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 13–20 (Cambridge, John Wilson &
Son 1891).
156. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
157. See generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION, 1770–1823 (1975); DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN
WESTERN CULTURE (1966).
158. (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, Loft 1.
159. Id. at 502.
160. Id. at 510.
161. See generally Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Comment, Nothing but Liberty: Somerset’s Case
and the British Empire, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 647 (2006).
162. See PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY
38–40 (1981).
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apprehended that they could not compel Northern states, with their
intensifying hostility to slavery in the 1780s, to return enslaved persons who
had escaped into their territory.163 With no explicit agreement, the default
rule of the law of nations would control.
This legal background explains the perceived need for the injunction in the
Fugitive Slave Clause that
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.164

Notably, however, that clause was limited to enslaved persons who escaped
to a free state. It did not extend to a case like that of James Somerset, whose
putative owner voluntarily transported him into a “free” jurisdiction. This
was true, Mansfield held, even within the quasi-confederation of the British
Empire.165 As a consequence, it would remain in the discretion of each
Northern state to decide whether to deem an enslaved person brought
voluntarily into its territory to be free. Nor was this a matter of controversy.
Indeed, for several decades Southern state judges uniformly ruled not only
that the law of nations permitted the Northern states to deem an enslaved
person taken voluntarily into their territory free but also that under the
principles of comity expressed in that law, their status as free persons would
be respected even when they returned to the state in which they had originally
been enslaved.166
Southern courts shifted on the issue only in the late antebellum period,
most notably in the litigation instituted by Dred Scott, which ultimately
yielded the infamous Supreme Court decision. This change reflected the
intensifying sectional conflict that culminated in the Civil War. Fittingly, the
Supreme Court in Scott v. Sandford167 refused to exercise jurisdiction over
the Supreme Court of Missouri’s refusal to apply the law of nations.168 But
the deep engagement of the Constitution with the evolving law-of-nations
approach to slavery belied Chief Justice Roger Taney’s unanalyzed dictum,
coming as he vaulted the Fifth Amendment’s protection of property above
the free soil principle of the law of nations, that “there is no law of nations
standing between the people of United States and their Government.”169 As

163. See id. at 40.
164. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
165. Somerset’s Case, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510.
166. See generally FINKELMAN, supra note 162; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF
ANTI-SLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848 (1977).
167. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
168. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS 330–34 (1978).
169. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451. Justice Taney would add that
[t]he powers of the Government, and the rights of the citizen under it, are positive
and practical regulations plainly written down. . . . And no laws or usages of other
nations, or reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of master and slave,
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it happened, there was. Indeed, six years later, President Abraham Lincoln
invoked the laws of war to emancipate all enslaved people in the secessionist
states.170
3. The Law of Nations and the Governance of Empire
The law of nations proved to be useful in yet another critical dimension of
governance in the early republic. Reflecting the fact that many European
nations were also colonizing empires, the law of nations contained essential
resources for constructing the imperial features of the American
constitutional project, especially the relationship between the federal
government and the Native American polities and the institution of
slavery.171 European empire builders had long invoked the law of nations to
conceptualize and justify the use of slave labor and to expropriate land from
Indigenous populations. The founding generation was deeply familiar with
both fields of legal rationalization, as well as with the fast and unpredictable
evolution of the consensual principles bearing on the two subjects during the
late eighteenth-century Enlightenment. As most white Americans ranked
settlement and development of the continent’s interior as a high
governmental priority—a project that required obtaining that land and then
finding labor to develop it—engagement with the law of nations in both areas
intensified after the Revolution. In this sense, at least, the Constitution was
imperial from the beginning.
a. Native America and the Constitution
Many complexities surrounded the original constitutional status of Native
American nations (or, as the drafters pointedly referred to them, tribes). The
degree of their sovereignty was hotly debated, often in juristic writings. Its
practical meaning, however, was worked out in diplomatic interactions.
Historians have mined those interactions between the federal government,
the states, and the Native Americans.172 These parties were never, however,
the only participants in that struggle. The British and Spanish empires, which
can enlarge the powers of the Government, or take from the citizens the rights they
have reserved.
Id.
170. BURRUS N. CARNAHAN, ACT OF JUSTICE: LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
AND THE LAW OF WAR 117–23 (2007); JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF
WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1–9 (2012).
171. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
172. See generally COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE INDIAN WORLD OF GEORGE WASHINGTON:
THE FIRST PRESIDENT, THE FIRST AMERICANS, AND THE BIRTH OF THE NATION (2019); 1
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS (abridged ed. 1984); LEONARD J. SADOSKY, REVOLUTIONARY
NEGOTIATIONS: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND DIPLOMATS IN THE FOUNDING OF AMERICA (2009);
RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT
LAKES REGION, 1650–1815 (1991). For “sovereignty” in imperial settings, see generally
LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES,
1400–1900 (2010).

1870

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

surrounded the American “neighborhood,”173 were also inside it. Both
empires had extensive military and commercial relations with Native
American nations within the western cession.174 When the federal
government began operations, commerce in land or goods with these western
nations was largely imaginary.175 What was imagined, however, was
boundless wealth for the new nation and its citizens.176
Two textual hooks suggest the role that the law of nations played in
structuring the relationship of the new government with the Native American
polities. One is the Treaty Clause.177 Treaty relations presumed that Native
American polities were, legally, foreign. This was how Britain and most of
the European empires had conducted relations with the Native Americans,
and the Federalists were determined to appear as though they were respecting
imperial ways.178 Ironically, though, the primary audience for this
international law claim was domestic: the states. Treating with the Native
Americans was part of the project of centralizing key features of governance,
especially foreign affairs and security, and it opened a new chapter in the
long story of cooperation and competition between the federal and state
governments for primacy in dealing with Native Americans. The other hook
was the so-called Indian Commerce Clause, sitting alongside the
international and interstate commerce clauses.179 Although aimed at the
states too, the Indian Commerce Clause signaled to foreign nations wishing
to treat with Native Americans within the borders of the United States that
the federal government claimed the power to regulate their trade.180
Together, the two clauses traced the beginning of a complex strategy of
federal governance over Native America: a monopoly not only in relation to
the states but also claimed against the neighboring empires. The law of
nations played a substantial role in both strategies, and Americans then added
new elements to that law that other settler nations borrowed as they
expropriated land and sovereignty from Indigenous people. Few areas of
early federal governance better demonstrate the power-conferring potential
of the law of nations than its deployment to obtain Native Americans’ land
and dominate their trade.
Making the nations located in Native America dependent nations was one
goal of Federalist governance under the new Constitution. It was ambitious,
173. See generally JAMES E. LEWIS JR., THE AMERICAN UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF
NEIGHBORHOOD: THE UNITED STATES AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE, 1783–1829
(1998).
174. See id. at 33–36.
175. See SADOSKY, supra note 172, at 79.
176. See ALAN TAYLOR, THE DIVIDED GROUND: INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND THE NORTHERN
BORDERLAND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 238 (2006).
177. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
178. See generally DOROTHY V. JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE: COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN
EARLY AMERICA (1982); LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY
OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005).
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce
Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1059–74 (2015).
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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requiring defter diplomacy and stronger force than the founders had
originally imagined. It was at least a familiar project. Dependency was a
known status in the law of nations. Vattel, for example, wrote of tributary
states, feudal states, treaties of protection, and unequal alliances.181 Small
nations frequently made treaties with larger or more powerful nations that
delegated some national powers, typically defensive powers, from the
dependent to the principal. The “weak state” (as Vattel called the junior
partner) might lose some freedom of action.182 If it “reserve[d] to itself the
sovereignty, or the right of governing its own body, it ought to be considered
as an independent state.”183 In sum, a weak state in a covenant for protection
did not “on this account, cease to rank among the sovereigns who
acknowledge no other law than that of nations.”184
A dependent relationship, therefore, was something like a partial, issuespecific confederacy between two nations. The relationship and remedies
were bilateral. Treaties of dependency did not bind third parties, although
when publicized, they did suggest that consequences might follow outside
interference. The European empires repeatedly used such treaties in Native
America in the century before the Revolution. The example of Sir William
Johnson, the British Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern
Department, and his decades-long relationship with (most of) the Six Nations
was well known to revolutionaries who fought in the Northern states and then
to federal state builders (often the same individuals).185
Persuading everyone across the Atlantic world that these dependent
nations were also domestic nations was another thing altogether. That
required turning a contractual relationship into a monopolistic property right,
excluding all interference by all other nations. It also involved converting
“borderlands” into “borders” and claiming that other nations could not reach
across them to engage in trade and diplomacy with Native Americans, at least
not without the consent of the United States as expressed in a treaty.186 Early
Americans tried to convert an international treaty relationship into a national
one, closer along the spectrum to confederation, without the equal footing
and shared decision-making that characterized confederations. It was a
fantasy from the perspective of 1789. Yet Washington’s cabinet believed in
it. Benefitting as they often did from European catastrophe from 1793 to
1815, successive federal administrations moved far toward reaching it—at
the expense of Native American autonomy.187
181. VATTEL, supra note 22, at 83–84.
182. Id. at 83.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See TAYLOR, supra note 176, at 235–65.
186. See, e.g., The Jay Treaty, supra note 154, art. 12 (permitting British traders in Canada
to trade with Native Americans in the United States without paying international tariffs and
vice versa). On the shift from borderlands to borders, see generally Jeremy Adelman &
Stephen Aron, From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in
Between in North American History, 104 AM. HIST. REV. 814 (1999).
187. For early federal policy regarding Native American land and trade, see generally
REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, 1783–1812 (1967).
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b. Slavery and the Constitution
The place of slavery within the eighteenth-century law of nations might be
as complicated as its place within the Constitution. The latter relationship
remains deeply contested among historians.188 Famously, although the
drafters avoided the term, slavery shaped congressional representation, the
Electoral College, the taxing power, the relationship between individual
states, and the federal power to regulate the international trade in human
beings.189 That cumulative effect was substantial, as Northern antiFederalists were quick to observe during the ratification debates.190 Daring
not to speak the word, though, said something. And the oblique way that the
drafters did write about slavery reflected their understanding of its legal
standing within the contemporary law of nations. One reason they could say
so little was because the legal premises were so well understood.
That understanding was transatlantic. Again, at about the same time as the
American Revolution, the European nations and empires began to
deaccession slavery from the law of nations.191 Americans who supported
the elimination of slavery grabbed hold of these developments and then
helped accelerate them.192 The loss of this bulwark of legitimation, reflected
most famously in Somerset’s Case, sent supporters of slavery searching for
new justifications within municipal law.
The clause forbidding Congress to prohibit the trade in human lives before
1808,193 for example, should be read against the background of
developments in the law of nations. The legality of the slave trade had long
rested on the justification that the laws of war permitted conquerors to
enslave their enemies as a lesser form of punishment than death. But as early
modern Europeans began to reject the ancient Roman law rule in wars among
themselves, the legal justification for the slave trade too came under pressure.
In the ensuing decades, some, like Chief Justice John Marshall, argued that
the laws of war among African nations still legitimized the practice.194
Others rejected the argument that the slave trade could be conducted under
legal auspices at all. Justice Joseph Story, for example, later credited the
United States with “having set the first example of prohibiting the further

188. Compare SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY AT THE
NATION’S FOUNDING (2018), with SLAVERY AND THE LAW (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997),
GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010), and DAVID WALDSTREICHER,
SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION (2009); see also We Respond
to the Historians Who Critiqued the 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/magazine/we-respond-to-the-historians-whocritiqued-the-1619-project.html [https://perma.cc/QG47-C2ZK].
189. See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 166, at 62–63.
190. See id. at 80–83.
191. See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text.
192. See id.
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
194. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 121 (1825).
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progress of this inhuman traffic.”195 As enslavement was jettisoned from the
laws of war, engaging in the transatlantic trade became a source of
transnational censure, while prohibiting it became one of emulation and
coordination. One example of the latter was the transatlantic correspondence
between the British Abolition Society and American manumission societies
and state governments during the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution.196
Prohibiting the trade was a mechanism by which the new nation could
contribute to reforming the law of nations. When delegates from Northern
states at the Constitutional Convention proposed prohibiting the trade,
however, representatives from the Deep South wrested a compromise:
Congress would have no power to prohibit the trade for twenty years. The
expectation was that, then, it would do so.197 The result was indirectly
coordinated and nearly simultaneous prohibitions on the international slave
trade in the British Empire and the United States.
As the legal justification for initial enslavement and the slave trade eroded,
slavery itself came under pressure.198 The legal default was, increasingly,
free soil. Slavery required protection in the positive municipal law, which,
again, is why Southerners demanded the Fugitive Slave Clause.199 More
generally, proslavery advocates developed the municipal law of property as
the primary bulwark against legal challenges to slavery itself, putting
constitutional protections of property on a collision course with the law of
nations premises of the Constitution’s federal structure.200
C. The General Law of Nations: Maritime and Commercial Law
Yet another field in which the founding generation employed the law of
nations to govern their federal state was the regulation of private transactions
in a range of disparate but important areas. Early American lawyers
classified an assortment of fields as part of the law of nations. Trading with
the enemy was one and it was widely applied by the courts without the need

195. Joseph Story, A Charge Delivered to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court of the United
States, at its First Session in Portland, for the Judicial District of Maine (May 8, 1820),
reprinted in 1 THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE AND AMERICAN COURTS 9, 22 (Paul Finkelman ed.,
ser. 5, 2007).
196. See, e.g., Letter from Granville Sharp to President, Vice President, and Treasurer of
The Soc’y Established in New York for the Manumission of Slaves (May 1, 1788), in 3 THE
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 329 (Henry P. Johnston ed., New York,
G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1891).
197. See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS 133–62 (3d ed. 2014).
198. Forced servitude for prisoners of war lasted into the early modern period, but it rested
on the municipal law of poor relief rather than the law of nations. See generally Sonia Tycko,
The Legality of Prisoner of War Labour in England, 1648–1655, PAST & PRESENT, Feb. 2020,
at 35.
199. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
200. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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for legislation. Conflict of laws, foreign judgments, and foreign evidence
were part of what one commentator called “The minor Law of Nations.”201
The largest remaining field, however, was not minor at all: commercial
law. Modern lawyers might classify the subject as the epitome of private
law. Early American lawyers were more likely to call it public law.202 It had
two branches: the law of merchants and maritime law.203 These were not
actually two separate subjects. Rather, both were species of commercial law,
with one covering transactions on land and the other those made on or
concerning oceanic trade. The premise was the same: because the
underlying activity tended to transcend national borders, so should the law
governing it.
This notion that commercial law was a transnational subject was common
across eighteenth-century Europe. The proximate doctrinal source of this
faith in the United States was again Lord Mansfield. “When Lord Mansfield
mentioned the law of merchants as being a branch of public law,” Kent
observed in his Commentaries on American Law,
it was because that law did not rest essentially for its character and authority
on the positive institutions and local customs of any particular country, but
consisted of certain principles and usages of trade, which general
convenience, and a common sense of justice had established, to regulate
the dealings of merchants and mariners in all the commercial countries of
the civilized world.204

Here “public law” was a rhetorical highlighter, referring to the law of nations
and designed to place such transactions beyond the jurisdiction of municipal
law. It was a hybrid: intrinsically international but concerning individuals.
Two local merchants creating a negotiable instrument or insuring a vessel’s
cargo were, whether they knew it or not, supporting actors in the epic drama
of civilization. And so their deal ought to be governed by the law of civilized
states.
Some American judges took the universal conceit further and argued that
even legislatures could not alter these rules. “From the nature of commerce,”
wrote New Hampshire Chief Justice Jeremiah Smith in 1806,
it is not capable of being regulated by the municipal laws of individual
states, but it must be governed by a code, which is respected by all civilized
nations, and denominated the Law Merchant. In respect of the universality
of this system, it may be considered as a portion of the law of nations; not
indeed regulating the intercourse of independent states, but obligatory on

201. Peter Stephen Du Ponceau, The Minor Law of Nations (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the American Philosophical Society).
202. 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1–3 (New York, O. Halsted 2d ed.
1832).
203. See id.
204. Id. at 2.
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the individuals of each state among themselves, and with the citizens of
other states, in the multifarious transactions of trade and commerce.205

Although this belief in an insulated and apolitical transnational
commercial law, supreme over municipal law, persisted throughout the
nineteenth century, it was never the dominant view.206 More subtly, many
lawyers assumed that legislatures should not change the substance of
commercial rules, though they had freer rein with altering remedies. Justice
Story endorsed this view in his opinion in Swift v. Tyson,207 in which he
claimed that the federal courts, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, had the power
to determine the applicable rules governing commercial law disputes, at least
in the absence of governing state statutes.208 The transnational premise of
this doctrine has been lost by finding that the court upheld “federal general
common law,”209 whereas in that much-misunderstood decision, Story did
not refer to the common law. The relevant rule was found elsewhere, in the
cosmopolitan body of commercial jurisprudence. “The general principles of
commercial law” were distinct and universal.210 Therefore, in the absence of
clear municipal law to the contrary, that transnational law operated in and
among the states.211
It is therefore ironic that today some legal academics and judges believe
just the opposite about the law of nations. They argue that all of the law of
nations—all international law outside the similarly constricting zone of treaty
law—is effectively just state common law and even then only insofar as the
state courts choose so to recognize it and the state legislatures refrain, in their
free discretion, from overruling or revising it.212
CONCLUSION
The law of nations was a pervasive language of governance in early
America. The Federalists found in it a multidimensional resource for nation
205. Book Review, 3 MONTHLY ANTHOLOGY & BOS. REV. 308, 312 (1806) (reviewing 1
GEORGE CAINES, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE LAW MERCHANT OF THE UNITED STATES; OR LEX
MERCATORIA AMERICANA (New York, Isaac Collins & Son 1802)) (citing Luke v. Lyde (1759)
97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617–618, 2 Burr. 882)). Although the book review was unsigned, the
authors believe Chief Justice Smith likely wrote it. See also 1 SAMUEL MARSHALL, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 18–19 (Boston, Manning & Lorring 1805) (referring to Lord
Mansfield and to marine insurance law as public law).
206. The Supreme Court usually followed state statutes that were contrary to the
transnational commercial law as rules of decision, though sometimes it did not. See TONY
ALLAN FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 90–94 (1979).
207. 41 U.S (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
208. See id. at 18–19.
209. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (overturning Swift).
210. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 22.
211. Even the best doctrinal scholarship on this branch of law does not locate it within the
law of nations. See generally William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513
(1984).
212. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8.
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building that was not narrowly concerned with international relations.
Instead, it was a capacious body of principles, maxims, and case histories for
governing, both at home and abroad. The law of nations also imported a
reflexive mode of reasoning, in which policy decisions were supposed to be
considered from the perspective not just of local interest but also of an
imagined impartial spectator.
Three dimensions of the law of nations were particularly useful in the early
republic. First, it was an indispensable resource for claiming independence
and then performing nationhood on the international stage. Second, the
comparative public law dimension proved useful to structuring the federal
state, in its vertical and horizontal dimensions, and for according it power to
act like a civilized nation and, for better or worse, an empire. Finally, the
transnational dimension of the law of nations provided a body of legal
principles to facilitate American citizens’ engagements in commercial and
other unofficial transactions with individuals from other nations.

